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To a great degree, research in memory forensics concentrates on the acquisition and
analysis of kernel- and user-space software from physical memory to date. With the sys-
tem ﬁrmware, a much more privileged software layer exists in modern computer systems
though that has recently become the target in sophisticated computer attacks more often.
Compromise strategies used by high proﬁle rootkits are almost completely invisible to
standard forensic procedures and can only be detected with special soft- or hardware
mechanisms. In this paper, we illustrate a variety of ﬁrmware manipulation techniques and
propose methods for identifying ﬁrmware-level threats in the course of memory forensic
investigations. We have implemented our insights into well-known open-source memory
forensic tools and have evaluated our approach within both physical and virtual
environments.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Over the last decade, forensic practitioners have
increasingly started to perceive the value of volatile infor-
mation in system RAM for the outcome of a case. Particu-
larly when suspecting potentially-installed malicious
applications on a compromised host, so-called memory
forensic investigation techniques can frequently conﬁrm
assumptions and yield results more quickly than tradi-
tional, persistent data-oriented approaches (Walters and
Petroni, 2007). The majority of research has thereby
concentrated on memory analysis, i.e., identifying relevant
data structures and subsequently extracting pieces of evi-
dence (for an overview of current practices, please refer to
Ligh et al. (2010) and V€omel and Freiling (2011)). The pro-
cess of securing said data in a forensically-sound manner
on the other hand, i.e., memory acquisition, has been
described to a signiﬁcantly lesser degree in the literature.(J. Stüttgen), stefan.
.uk (M. Denzel).
ier Ltd on behalf of DFRWSThis fact is quite surprising, considering that recent works
have indicated quality deﬁciencies in popular imaging so-
lutions under certain conditions that may severely impede
or even prevent thorough artifact examination at a later
time (V€omel and Stüttgen, 2013; Stüttgen and Cohen,
2013).
In order to mitigate this research gap, we will discuss
several scenarios in this paper that exemplify various hur-
dles and pitfalls modern memory acquisition technologies
must overcome. With respect to this, we will focus on
speciﬁc system manipulation strategies on the ﬁrmware
level, in contrast to other studies that illustrate issues in
kernel or user space (see Ligh et al., 2010; White et al.,
2013). Although only a comparatively small amount of
malicious programs distributed in the wild are known of
explicitly attacking base components and features of a
system, the lower machine layers have received broader
attention by malware authors in the last years, especially
with regard to the development of Advanced Persistent
Threats (APTs) and special rootkits that are remarkably
difﬁcult to detect and remove (Shields, 2008; Davis et al.,
2010). As we will see, however, the vast number of. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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date are unfortunately ill-prepared for dealing with such
threats and fail at properly duplicating all sources of a
computer's physical address space in which malicious code
may reside.Contributions of the paper
In the scope of the paper, wewill see thatmost ﬁrmware
code and data can be accessed over the memory bus. We
present a broad survey of ﬁrmware rootkit techniques and
the traces such threats leave in a system. To facilitate
acquisition and analysis of potential infections, we have
developed methods for enumerating, imaging, and exam-
ining ﬁrmware components and implemented them into
free, open-source utilities. The reliability of these utilities is
evaluated with the help of a proof-of-concept ACPI rootkit
as well as manipulated BIOS ROMs.Related work
As we have already indicated, the development of ma-
licious programs that are directly stored and executed on
the hardware or ﬁrmware layer has increased over the last
years. Stewin and Bystrov (2012), for instance, outline
techniques for silently capturing keystrokes or extracting
sensitive information such as cryptographic keys from a
running machine with the help of Direct Memory Access
(DMA). Embleton et al. (2008) illustrate how the pro-
cessor's System Management Mode (SMM) may be misused
for storing malevolent code, while Tereshkin andWojtczuk
(2009) manipulate the chipset of the Memory Controller
Hub (MCH) for these purposes.
With respect to forensic investigations, other authors
have attempted to leverage speciﬁc features or components
of the hardware. Most notably, the IEEE 1394 (FireWire)
interface or the more recent Thunderbolt port permit
duplicating the contents of memory from a target system
quite easily (see Zhang et al., 2011; Maartmann-Moe, 2012).
In contrast, Wang et al. (2011) as well as Reina et al. (2012)
describe a prototype implementation for creating a
consistent copy of the physical address space by entering
the System Management Mode. Memory acquisition based
on DMA operations over a network card is subject of the
work of Balogh and Mydlo (2013). Last but not least,
obtaining the contents of ﬁrmware ROMs is the speciﬁc
goal of the Copernicus project (Butterworth et al., 2013).
Copernicus permits extracting ﬁrmware data directly over
the Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) bus. Because this
approach is vulnerable to malicious software running in
System Management Mode, the latest implementation
utilizes the Intel TXT extensions (Intel Corporation, 2014c)
to isolate the acquisition module from other parts of the
system (Kovah et al., 2014).
Most of the previously described technologies have not
or only insufﬁciently been evaluated. First, more extensive
studies concerning the quality of imaging applications
were presented by V€omel and Stüttgen (2013) and Stüttgen
and Cohen (2013). We will further elaborate upon these
works and assess the performance of common imagingproducts, speciﬁcally when sophisticated malware species
are present.
Outline of the paper
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows: In
Section Background, we brieﬂy deﬁne the type of malicious
programwewill concentrate on throughout our discussion.
We also describe standard approaches for acquiring a copy
of main memory from different operating systems and give
an overview of several ﬁrmware features and technologies
that help the reader better understand later parts of our
work. A survey of current ﬁrmware rootkit techniques and
their implications for memory forensic investigations is
presented in Section Rootkit Strategies for Compromising
Firmware. Methods for enumerating and acquiring ﬁrm-
ware code and data are subject of Section Firmware
Acquisition Using Memory Forensics. In Section Firmware
Analysis, we discuss the analysis of the acquired data, fol-
lowed by an evaluation of how well these approaches are
already incorporated in common forensic suites and ap-
plications in Section Evaluation. Aspects and limitations
that need to be considered when applying the respective
concepts in real-world investigations are discussed in
Section Discussion. We conclude with a short summary of
our work and indicate various opportunities for future
research in Section Conclusion.
Background
In the scope of this paper, we discuss challenges and
pitfalls formemoryacquisition solutions thatoperatewithin
a hostile environment, i.e., the target system is likely to have
been affected by malicious programs, and the integrity of
the machine cannot be trusted. In Section Rootkits, we
specify the conditions the respective acquisition technolo-
giesmust copewith inmoredetail andgive amore thorough
deﬁnitionof the rootkit term. In SectionMemoryAcquisition
Process, weoutline basic approaches for duplicating volatile
information on different operating systems. The character-
istics of major ﬁrmware technologies are subject of Sections
SystemFirmwareeACPI. The informationpresented in these
sections ismainly based on thework of Salihun (2006), Dice
(2013) as well as the respective vendor speciﬁcations (Intel
Corporation, 2014b; PCI-SIG, 2010) and is required to better
understand the technical complexities illustrated in later
parts of this paper. Readers who are already familiar with
rootkits and have a solid knowledge of the BIOS, PCI, and
ACPI environment may safely skip these explanations and
directly proceed to Section Rootkit Strategies for
Compromising Firmware.
Rootkits
A particularly sophisticated type of malicious programs
are so-called rootkits. Rootkits are deﬁned to consist of a set
of programsand code that allowsapermanentor consistent,
undetectable presence on a computer (Hoglund and Butler,
2005, p. 4). They are intentionally designed to project a
manipulated view to the system user in order to achieve the
primary objectives concealment, surveillance as well as
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Depending on the execution mode they operate in, rootkits
are commonly divided into distinct classes. These include
the user as well as kernel space, the system library level, the
hypervisor level (sometimes also referred to as ring -1, in
reference to the ring architecture of the x86 processor
family), and ﬁnally, the ﬁrmware level (see Shields, 2008). In
this paper, only the latter layer will be in the focus of our
discussion. Introductions concerning samples running in
higher levels of the system abstraction can be found in the
works of Vieler (2007) and Davis et al. (2010).
Memory acquisition process
One of the most common and convenient methods for
obtaining a copy of volatile memory is the use of an im-
aging utility. Due to security restrictions, the respective
programs can usually not be entirely executed in user space
(e.g., see Microsoft Corporation, 2013), but must rather
inject a special kernel driver or module into the core of the
operating system. With regard to Microsoft Windows,
frequently-applied procedures involve either reading from
the yy.yDeviceyPhysicalMemory section object or
calling one of the memory-mapping APIs of the kernel, i.e.,
MmMapIOSpace() or MmMapMemoryDumpMdl(). On Linux
platforms, the predominant approach is similar and relies
on parsing the iomem_resource tree and mapping
memory using the kmap() API (Sylve, 2012).
One distinctive disadvantage of software-based imagers
is that they may easily fall prey to manipulation (Stüttgen
and Cohen, 2013). Moreover, because they run in parallel
to other system processes, the state of memory is in a
constant state of ﬂux, leading to a drastically reduced level
of atomicity of the generated snapshot (V€omel and Freiling,
2012). To mitigate these drawbacks, researchers have out-
lined various alternatives that explicitly leverage the ca-
pabilities of speciﬁc hardware features and technologies.
These include, for instance, the Intel VMX instruction set
for accessing physical memory from an isolated hypervisor
environment (Martignoni et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2012) as
well as patching the system BIOS for transparently and
reliably writing out the contents of memory via the pro-
cessor's SystemManagementMode (SMM,Wang et al., 2011;
Reina et al., 2012). An overview and comparison of the in-
dividual propositions can be found in the work of V€omel
and Freiling (2011).
System ﬁrmware
The system ﬁrmware, i.e., the Basic Input Output System
(BIOS) or the Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) on more
modern systems, is the ﬁrst program that runs on the CPU
when a computer is turned on. The respective code is saved
in a non-volatile storage area, usually an EEPROM, on the
mainboard of the machine. The north- and southbridge are
initially conﬁgured to map the contents of this ROM into
the physical address space at an architecture-speciﬁc
location inside the ﬁrst megabyte of the address space.11 On most x86 systems this range spans from 0xF0000 to 0xFFFFF.The ROM is also aliased in a way that 16 bytes are map-
ped to the physical address 0xFFFFFFF0, at the CPUs reset
vector (Intel Corporation, 2014b).
The ﬁrmware code initially runs on the ROM chip. It
then moves from ROM into RAM by manipulating special
registers, the so-called Programmable Attribute Map (PAM),
to shadow the ROM-mapped regions with RAM and
uncompressing its code image intomemory. Firmware then
starts initializing devices on the PCI bus and maps their
registers and memory into the physical address space as
required. It is during this phase that the BIOS and EFI start
to differ greatly, and the ﬁnal layout of the physical address
space is determined (Dice, 2013; UEFI Forum, 2014).
BIOS
The BIOS runtime environment operates in 16-bit real
mode. It is responsible for creating an Interrupt Vector Table
(IVT) in order to support a set of simple operations, e.g.
sending output to the screen or reading data from a hard
disk. The latter functionality is required to drive the boot-
strapping process and load the boot manager as well as the
operating system eventually. Precisely, the BIOS reads the
code of the boot manager into memory and hands over
control.2 The boot manager, in turn, loads the operating
system and further prepares the system environment. For
these tasks, the primary BIOS services are used. In the last
step, the operating system takes over interrupt handling by
replacing the IVT with an appropriate Interrupt Descriptor
Table (IDT). Thereby, direct access to the BIOS services is lost.
EFI
Contrary to BIOS-based ﬁrmware, EFI operates in 32-bit
protected mode. The boot process comprises a distinct se-
curity phase (SEC) in which the integrity of the ﬁrmware is
explicitly checked, and secure booting is facilitated. In a
second, so-called Pre-EFI Initialization (PEI) phase, similar
tasks as during early BIOS initialization are performed.
However, at the end of this phase, EFI provides a structured
Driver Execution Environment (DXE) for drivers and services.
These are not loaded from the MBR but from the ﬁle system
of a designated EFI System Partition. The location of the
respective images are speciﬁed in Non-Volatile RAM
(NVRAM) on the mainboard. Drivers, bootloaders, and the
OS can interact with the ﬁrmware through speciﬁc pro-
tocols. After the operating system has started, it still has
access to some ﬁrmware interfaces through the so-called
EFI runtime services.
PCI option ROMs
Because the system ﬁrmware has no internal knowledge
of the functionality and speciﬁcs of attached devices,
complementary code that is required for unique device
initialization is stored on a separate chip. With regard to
hardware cards that are connected via the PCI bus, the
respective instruction set is saved in a read-only area on the
device, the so-called PCI Option ROM. In order to be2 The boot manager is resident in the Master Boot Record (MBR) on the
ﬁrst hard disk.
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conﬁguration space, i.e., 256 bytes of registers that control
the behavior of the PCI device at all times (Salihun, 2013, p.
9). Part of this space are two special registers at offsets
0x04 (Command Register) and 0x30 (Expansion ROM Base
Address Register), each of them contains a bit that must be
explicitly set before operations on the ROM can be executed
(Salihun, 2013).
The ROM itself is typically composed of a number of
separated code images that apply to different processor
architectures and platforms. For a given machine, always
only one particular image is chosen and run though
(Salihun, 2012). The format and contents of an image are
standardized and incorporate a header and PCI data
structure (see Salihun, 2006). The header includes a
signature bytestring and a pointer that references the
adjacent data structure. The PCI data structure, in turn, is
located in the ﬁrst 64 kilobytes and contains several iden-
tiﬁers with device and vendor information as well as pa-
rameters for the image and code size. These values are later
needed for dynamically ﬁtting the code base into memory.
Precisely, device-speciﬁc tasks are not carried out in-place,
but the system ﬁrmware rather transfers the image ﬁle into
RAM below the 1-MB boundary in the course of the Power-
On Self Test (POST).3 A custom INIT function that is invoked
during this process is responsible for adjusting the image
size to the actual runtime requirements. Thereby, available
memory can be used as efﬁciently as possible.
For further explanations concerning the previously
described steps, the reader is referred to the ofﬁcial speci-
ﬁcation (PCI-SIG, 2010).
ACPI
The Advanced Conﬁguration and Power Interface (ACPI)
deﬁnes a platform-independent interface speciﬁcation
comprised of both software and hardware elements for
device conﬁguration and power management (ACPI
Promoters Corporation, 2013, p. 4). The interface consists
of three components, i.e., the ACPI System DescriptionTables,
the ACPI Registers, and the ACPI BIOS. Moreover, system-
speciﬁc drivers facilitate communication between the
hardware and software layer and implement methods for
easily accessing the provided functionality.
Of the three interface components, the ACPI System
Description Tables are most interesting. They contain
structured information about the computing environment,
available devices as well as their capabilities, and may be
read out by the operating system-directed conﬁguration and
power management (OSPM) unit. The information is stored
in so-called deﬁnition blocks and encoded in a special
language, the ACPI Machine Language (AML). AML may be
converted into the ACPI Source Language (ASL) format for
better readability, a step wewill describe in more detail in a
later part of this paper.
In order to process a deﬁnition block, the OSPM must
ﬁrst locate a pointer to the main ACPI table, i.e., the Root3 For legacy devices, the image is mapped in the address space between
regions 0xC0000 and 0xDFFFF (see Salihun, 2006).System Description Table (RSDT).4 For this purpose, a
signature-based scan in memory is applied.5 Once the table
has been found, pointers to various other important system
tables can be identiﬁed, e.g., to the Fixed ACPI Description
Table (FADT) or to the Differentiated System DescriptionTable
(DSDT). While the former saves the addresses of a number
of power management-related register blocks, the latter
supplies the implementation and conﬁguration informa-
tion about the base system (ACPI Promoters Corporation,
2013, p. 19).
Rootkit strategies for compromising ﬁrmware
In this section, we present a survey concerning the
current state of the art in x86 ﬁrmware exploitation. We
illustrate attacks on the BIOS and EFI environment,
respectively, on PCI Option ROMS as well as ACPI, and
outline the respective traces that may be recoverable dur-
ing memory forensics.
While ﬁrmware rootkits are highly target-speciﬁc and
require a lot of in-depth knowledge to develop, malware
authors have demonstrated that building working pro-
totypes is feasible, and various approaches have already
been adopted by different species “in the wild” (Giuliani,
2013).BIOS- and EFI-Based attacks
As Bulygin et al. (2014) report, a signiﬁcant number of
BIOS/EFI attacks were successfully carried out in the past.
Despite update signature veriﬁcation, secure boot, and other
security measures at the ﬁrmware level, many feasible
attack vectors still exist. In the following, we give a brief
overview of common system compromise strategies.
Flash protection registers
When an x86 computer is ﬁrst switched on, the ROM
containing the ﬁrmware is initially writable through the SPI
bus. This functionality is necessary to permit legitimate
installation of new ﬁrmware updates. On the other hand,
before control is handed to the operating system, SPI ﬂash
must be properly locked down to prevent software from
overwriting the ROM. However, many vendors fail at these
tasks and leave the respective areas open for manipulation
(Bulygin, 2013; Bulygin et al., 2013). As a consequence,
malicious code may ﬂash the ﬁrmware ROM directly from
kernel space and incorporate malevolent functionality.
Insecure ﬁrmware updates
Most BIOS update implementations do not require a
cryptographic signature. They process any source ﬁle as
long as it matches a given format. This ﬂaw was exploited
by the Mebromi rootkit to infect versions of Award BIOS
(Bulygin et al., 2014). In contrast, modern ﬁrmware tech-
nologies based on EFI are more wary of such attack vectors4 On modern systems, this structure is superseded by the Extended
System Description Table (XSDT).
5 For more information concerning the exact memory locations, please
refer to the ACPI speciﬁcation (ACPI Promoters Corporation, 2013, p. 107).
Fig. 1. Firmware memory ranges.
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However, the respective algorithms may contain uninten-
tional errors and, thus, be susceptible themselves as
Wojtczuk and Tereshkin (2009) argue.
Physical attacks
Evenwith all softwaremeasures perfectly implemented,
a malicious adversary at an arbitrary position in the supply
chain can modify a system's ﬁrmware with the help of a
ﬂash programmer. As recently outlined by Brossard (2012),
these tasks can be easily accomplished using open ﬁrm-
ware like Coreboot (Minnich, 2014), SeaBIOS (O'Connor,
2014), or iPXE (Brown, 2014).
Memory forensic implications
All of the previously described attacks ultimately result
in reprogramming of the ﬁrmware ﬂash ROM. As laid out in
Section System Firmware, the ROM chip is mapped on the
memory bus from 0xF0000 to 0xFFFFF. It is therefore
possible to include said region in a memory image and
analyze the duplicated pages in a later step.
PCI option ROM-Based attacks
Because some PCI devices require custom initialization,
system ﬁrmware loads and executes any option ROM pro-
videdbydevices duringboot time. This code runs inﬁrmware
context while SPI ﬂash is unlocked and can therefore patch
the ﬁrmware ROM effortlessly. For instance, as Brossard
(2012) points out, it is possible to load a bootkit over the
built-in Wiﬁ or WiMax devices of the system by ﬂashing a
maliciousoptionROMontoanetwork card.Thereby,ﬁrewalls
or intrusion detection systems can be bypassed.
A vulnerable ﬁrmware version can also be directly
exploited over the network: Triulzi (2010) outlines tech-
niques for remotely reﬂashing the ﬁrmware of speciﬁc
network cards. Even worse, because PCI devices have un-
restricted access to physical memory, additional malicious
codemay be downloaded in order to further propagate into
the local network.
Last but not least, a system may also be compromised
using a malicious device that is attached over a hardware
port and initiating a subsequent reboot. For example,
Loukas (2012) shows how an Apple computer may be
infected with malware by connecting a small ethernet
adapter to the Thunderbolt port. Because Thunderbolt
hardware has direct access to the PCI bus and, thus, to
physical memory, the machine is prone to attack, in cor-
respondence to our previous explanations.
Memory forensic implications
The different attacks outlined above result in the
introduction of one or more new PCI Option ROMs into the
system. Firmware maps these ROMs somewhere into the
physical address space and stores a pointer to their location
in PCI conﬁguration space. Similarly to the ﬁrmware ROM,
Option ROMs can also be read over the memory bus, and
thus, their code can also be included in a memory image. In
addition, because ﬁrmware copies Option ROMs for
execution purposes into the memory area between ad-
dresses 0xC0000 and 0xE0000 (see Section PCI optionROM's), it is possible to consider the respective pages
during memory acquisition as well.
ACPI-based attacks
ACPI programs run in kernel space and therefore have
full permission to operate on the physical address space.
Even though sensitive data structures could theoretically
be protected efﬁciently by ﬁltering the respective in-
structions in the AML virtual machine, such restrictions
have not yet been implemented in any major operating
system to the best of our knowledge. Neither Linux up to
kernel 3.15 nor Windows up to version 8 seem to have
security measures in place to prevent ACPI programs from
subverting the system core. Because the ACPI tables are
provided by the ﬁrmware, they are implicitly trusted. In the
presence of a skilled adversary, this assumption may be
potentially devastating.
The vulnerability we have just outlined can be exploited
in several ways: First, it is possible to patch the ACPI tables
directly in the ﬁrmware image. In addition, because the
tables are copied to memory and must be identiﬁed by the
operating system, a malicious bootkit has the chance of
modifying them prior to this process. Alternatively, a
manipulated version of the tables can be placed right in
front of the ﬁrmware-provided copy. Since the location of
the pointer to the Root Description System Table is not
strictly deﬁned and must be retrieved by the operating
systemwith the help of a signature-based scan (see Section
ACPI), only the manipulated version is found, while the
original and legitimate code is never executed. As a
consequence, an ACPI rootkit may be embedded in either
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ROM, on a connected PCI device, or even as part of an EFI
driver module. Detection and removal of such a threat is
cumbersome, and most of the described methods even
survive a complete wipe of the hard disk.
A proof of concept implementation of an ACPI rootkit for
the Linux kernel has already been published (see Heasman,
2006). The rootkit hooks all unused system calls by over-
writing the sys_ni_syscall() function with the in-
structions call ebx; ret;. Because the ebx register is
controlled by code running in user space, effectively all
programs with an arbitrary privilege level are able to
execute code in kernel space. The concept can be used to,
e.g., illegitimately gain additional permissions or load
additional kernel rootkits even in case kernel module
loading has been disabled. However, at the point of this
writing, we are not aware that these insights are being
actively abused by malicious programs in the wild.
Memory forensic implications
Irrespectively of the original attack vector, the ACPI ta-
bles must be placed into RAM in order for the operating
system to ﬁnd and execute them. As a consequence, they
can be included into a memory image. If the tables are
supplied by the ﬁrmware or a malicious Option ROM, all
ﬁrmware ROMs should be included in the memory image.
Firmware in the physical address space
As we have indicated in the previous sections, there are
many regions in the physical address space that contain
ﬁrmware code and data. A typical layout of the address
space, taken from a test machine, is illustrated in Fig. 1. In
the ﬁgure, regions that are not highlighted contain physical
RAM and are marked as “Memory”. Such regions are
generally considered by standard physical memory acqui-
sition solutions. In contrast, regions colored in blue contain
ﬁrmware code or data. As we have pointed out, these re-
gions can also be accessed through the memory bus and
have to be duplicated if ﬁrmware analysis should be
included in the memory forensic investigation. Finally, re-
gions marked in red represent memory-mapped I/O areas
and must not be touched as even read operations on these
addresses may trigger interrupts on the device and, thus,
lead to data corruption or unintentional system crashes. In
the worst case, the interrupt may cause the device to
exceed its operational parameters, and physical damage is
caused.
Firmware acquisition using memory forensics
As pointed out in Section Memory Acquisition Process,
memory acquisition software commonly relies on the
operating system to identify and map physical memory.
Precisely, imaging programs duplicate solely those parts of
the address space that are explicitly marked as RAM. On
Microsoft Windows, the respective regions are usually
identiﬁed using the MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges()
API (Stüttgen and Cohen, 2013). However, further but less
common methods do exist: On systems with a BIOS, for
instance, the ﬁrmware memory mapmay be queried in realmode by setting the eax register to 0xE820 and repeatedly
invoking interrupt 0x15. This method is usually applied by
the boot manager, and the retrieved information is passed
to the operating system for further processing. During
runtime, it is not advisable to manually switch to real mode
from a driver as this can cause system instabilities. Fortu-
nately, since Windows Vista, the kernel's Hardware
Abstraction Layer (HAL) includes an undocumented BIOS
emulation module that permits drivers accessing BIOS
services directly (Chappell, 2010).
Enumeration of the physical address space
Each memory enumeration method provides a unique
view of the physical address space. None of them is entirely
accurate though, because most devices (especially on the
PCI bus) are not directly managed by the operating system
but by a vendor-supplied driver. In Fig. 2, a direct com-
parison of three major sources of information on the
physical address space is shown.
The most incomplete view of the physical address space
is returned when querying the MmGetPhysicalMemor-
yRanges() API in the windows memory manager. As we
have argued in the previous section, memory imaging
programs only acquire those ranges that are identiﬁed as
being available by the operating system. For safety reasons,
other areas are ignored, including regions of memory that
are used by the ﬁrmware. For this reason, memory images
obtained through this method are not suited for ﬁrmware
examinations. With respect to a test system that we have
analyzed, a created memory image only contains two
ranges of physical memory (see Fig. 2 on the right). The
remaining regions in the image are either zero-padded or
not part of the image at all (e.g., when using the crash dump
approach (Microsoft Corporation, 2011)).
As depicted in the center part of Fig. 2, the BIOS provides
a better view of the physical address space. Additionally to
the memory regions identiﬁed by the memory manager,
the BIOS also keeps track of memory used by ACPI.
Furthermore, there are 3072 bytes of memory right at the
end of the ﬁrst memory region that the operating system
does not know about. This area represents hidden memory
that is simply neither used by the BIOS nor the OS (Stüttgen
and Cohen, 2013).
EFI offers a similar service to the BIOS memory map.
However, because it is a boot service, it is not available
anymore once the boot manager has handed control to the
operating system. The layout and classiﬁcation of memory
ranges is the same though.
The most exhaustive map of the physical address space
can be constructed by intersecting knowledge from the
architecture speciﬁcations with an enumeration of PCI
conﬁguration space. This view is illustrated on the left side
of Fig. 2: As discussed in Section System Firmware, the
physical address space layout in the ﬁrst megabyte is well-
deﬁned. Areas that are reported here as being “reserved”
(or not available at all) are either ﬁrmware code, ﬁrmware
data, or video memory. Please note that the mentioned
ﬁrmware ROMs in these regions are not actually mapped
ROMs anymore. Due to performance reasons, ﬁrmware
migrates into memory during initialization (see Sections
J. Stüttgen et al. / Digital Investigation 12 (2015) S50eS60S56System Firmware and PCI option ROM's). It is therefore safe
to read from these addresses and perform memory acqui-
sition just like with regions that are explicitly marked as
RAM.
The memory layout above the ﬁrst megabyte is not
deﬁned and depends on the amount of installed memory as
well as on the number of installed devices. Because the
latter map registers and memory into this part of the
address space, simply iterating through the entire area
would be a dangerous process since the respective opera-
tions could trigger interrupts and result in undeﬁned
behavior, loss of data, or even physical damage to the de-
vice (see Section Firmware in the Physical Address Space).
Therefore, in order to avoid instabilities, software needs to
consult the ﬁrmware or operating system upon what areas
are safe to read (Stüttgen and Cohen, 2013).
Because the ACPI tables lie somewhere outside of the
memory regions reported by the operating system, it is
prudent to acquire as muchmemory from the upper part as
safely possible. Furthermore, it is trivial for malware to
hook the kernel memory enumeration APIs and hide from
the acquisition. Because the real danger of accessing
memory outside the available regions comes from touching
PCI device memory, it is best to simply exclude all MMIO
regions and acquire all remaining sections.
Stüttgen and Cohen (2013) have shown that it is
possible to ﬁnd all MMIO regions of PCI devices by
enumerating the PCI conﬁguration space. As explained in
Section PCI option ROM's, all PCI devices must implement
such a space with special address registers that specify the
exact location and size of all MMIO regions (PCI-SIG, 2010).
As long as these regions remain untouched, it is safe to read
from any other address in the entire physical address
space.6
To sum up, the blue regions (in web version) on the left
of Fig. 2 do not necessarily contain RAM. Reading fromparts
of the physical address space that are not mapped simply
returns zeroes.7 The resulting image is signiﬁcantly larger
than an image that solely comprises ranges being marked
as available but includes the entire ﬁrmware code and data.
For this reason, we deem this trade acceptable.Mapping of memory and ﬁrmware regions
Some of the ﬁrmware regions in the physical address
space we have identiﬁed are in fact RAM. The BIOS area,
ACPI tables, and the legacy PCI Option ROM area in the ﬁrst
megabyte are stored in memory and can therefore be
accessed with the help of conventional methods like
kmap(). Others are part of the memory-mapped I/O space
which may lead to problems with standard memory-
mapping functions due to caching constraints. While it is
possible to use the iomap_nocache() API on Linux or6 There can be non-PCI devices in the address space, e.g., HPET, RTC, or
APIC. In our experiments we found no indication that reading from their
mapped registers caused any problems.
7 It is possible that some systems return another pattern or even data
that is still on the bus from a previous read. However, we have not wit-
nessed such behavior during our tests.MmMapIOSpace() on Windows, respectively, we prefer to
completely bypass the operating system for accessing de-
vice memory. If an area of memory has already been
mapped by a driver or even the kernel itself, care has to be
taken to conform to caching attributes in order to avoid
memory corruption. The Windows kernel will actually
prevent any attempts to map memory that has already
been mapped with different caching attributes, thus mak-
ing use of standard operating system memory-mapping
facilities unreliable (Vidstrom, 2006).
Our method of memory acquisition is based on direct
remapping of page table entries with a kernel module (see
Stüttgen and Cohen, 2013). When a page is about to be
acquired, the module remaps a page in its data segment to
point to the physical page in question by directly manipu-
lating the corresponding page table entry. After ﬂushing
the Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB), the driver can then
read the desired page by reading from the data segment.
Because this method uses a separate mapping and is
guaranteed to only read from this mapping, we can avoid
running into problems with cache coherence and align-
ment requirements (Stüttgen and Cohen, 2013). In addition,
because the mapping is manually created and the memory
management APIs are bypassed, the operating system is
unable to interfere with these operations as already indi-
cated. The resulting memory image contains the entire
memory, ﬁrmware code and data, and can be analyzedwith
standard memory forensic suites such as Rekall (Cohen,
2013) or Volatility (Walters, 2009).
We have implemented the previously described tech-
niques in the free, open-source memory acquisition utili-
ties Winpmem and Pmem (Cohen, 2013). With the help of
these utilities, ﬁrmware code and data on both Windows
and Linux can be efﬁciently acquired.
Firmware analysis
Firmware implementation is highly dependent on the
platform. Even executable formats and code compression
schemes vary wildly from vendor to vendor. It is out of the
scope of this paper to present generic ﬁrmware code
analysis and veriﬁcation solutions. However, since most of
the locations of ﬁrmware code are clearly deﬁned, it is
trivial to disassemble these, e.g., using the dis plugin of the
Recall framework (Cohen, 2013). ACPI code on the other
hand allows for more automation on the analysis side. We
have created two plug-ins for both Volatility and Rekall.
One plug-in permits extracting the ACPI tables from a
memory image, a second plug-in facilitates scanning the
respective tables for potential rootkits. To extract the
different tables, we have mirrored the process used by the
OSPM unit. Speciﬁcally, a signature-based scan for the Root
System Description Table (RSDT) is performed (see Section
ACPI). Once the RSDT is found, we process the respective
pointers to locate associated ACPI structures. All tables are
ﬁnally saved to the ﬁle system for further analysis.
With respect to the latter task, we ﬁrst decompile and,
in a second step, examine the tables for signs of malicious
behavior. The central technique for manipulating kernel
memory from an ACPI program is the deﬁnition of so-called
operating regions. Such regions determine which part of
Fig. 2. Physical memory layout views.
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detecting malicious behavior is thus to identify all opera-
tion regions that reference kernel memory. In the course of
investigation, an analyst may then use this information to
particularly focus on these parts of the ASL program.
Our plug-in utilizes the ofﬁcial AML decompiler (Intel
Corporation, 2014a) to transform the AML code into ACPI
Source Language. Subsequently, the resulting ASL code is
scanned, and all operation regions referencing critical
memory are ﬂagged as suspicious, i.e., parts of physical
memory that contain kernel code and data.
Evaluation
We have evaluated the created acquisition utilities for
stability, correctness, and, in case of the ACPI triage plug-
ins, for rate of detection and number of false positives
and negatives as well.Stability and correctness of the acquisition method
To assess the stability and correctness of our approach,
we set up several physical as well as virtual machines and
created duplicates of their physical address space. The
machines comprised the following conﬁguration:
 A Lenovo x220 notebook with an Intel Sandy Bridge CPU
and 8 GBs of DDR3 RAM running Ubuntu 12.04 x64
 ADellworkstationwith Intel Ivy Bridge CPU and 8 GBs of
DDR3 RAM running Windows 8.1 x64
 A virtual machine based on VirtualBox with 4 GBs of
RAM running Debian 7 x64 with Kernel 3.2.41 A virtual machine based on VirtualBox with 2 GBs of
RAM running Windows 7 SP1 x64
All acquisition operations were successfully completed
every time.We could identify the ﬁrmware regions in every
image with corresponding data. We were not able to verify
the ﬁrmware though, because we did not have access to
EEPROM reprogramming hardware and, thus, did not have
access to the original contents of the ﬁrmware ROM.
Additionally, because most ﬁrmware implementations are
compressed to save space, proper veriﬁcation would
require reverse engineering of the ﬁrmware compression
algorithm and analysis of the decompressed ROM image. To
establish correct ﬁrmware acquisitionwithout access to the
ROM nonetheless, we leveraged features of virtualization
software. Speciﬁcally, qemu-kvm (Linux Kernel
Organization, 2014) permits loading custom BIOS images
over the -bios command line option. With the help of the
-option-rom parameter, it is possible to load a custom
Option ROM as well.
We started a qemu-kvm-based virtual machine with a
known BIOS version (SeaBIOS, O'Connor, 2014) and a
known Option ROM (iPXE, Brown, 2014). By acquiring
memory from inside the virtual machine, we obtained an
image with known BIOS and PCI Option ROM code. We
were able to ﬁnd fragments of the iPXE and SeaBIOS images
in the created memory images at their expected locations.
In addition, we could identify parts of the dumped ﬁrm-
ware to come from the supplied ROM images. Other parts
were heavily modiﬁed though and are likely to have been
space-optimized in memory. Further experiments are
needed in the future to conﬁrm these assumptions.
Table 2
Classiﬁcation of operation regions in the test data set.
Correctly classiﬁed Falsely classiﬁed
P
Malicious 13.0% 16.4% 29.4%
Benign 61.9% 61.9%
Unknown 8.7% 8.7%
P
83.6% 16.4% 100%
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We have evaluated a large group of freely-available
memory acquisition solutions to see if they are capable of
correctly obtaining ﬁrmware code and data. The results of
our evaluation are depicted in Table 1. Thereby, an entry
labeled with the extension pci means that the respective
version of the program supports PCI address space
enumeration (see Section Enumeration of the Physical
Address Space). As can be seen, only those two versions
were able to acquire all ﬁrmware code and data. All other
tools simply imaged the available ranges supplied by the
Windows Memory Manager or, on Linux systems, by the
iomem_resource tree (see Section Memory Acquisition
Process), and do not contain any ﬁrmware-related con-
tent at all.Detection of ACPI rootkits
We created a simple ACPI rootkit that is capable of
modifying the Linux kernel and setting up a hidden back-
door, analogously to the proof of concept application by
Heasman (2006) as described in Section ACPI-Based
Attacks. The rootkit was installed on ﬁve virtual machines
running Fedora 19, Ubuntu 12.04, Debian 7, OpenSuse 12.3,
andWindows XP as well as two physical Intel Sandy Bridge
systems running Ubuntu 12.04. Each system was analyzed
with the help of the scanner plug-in we developed for the
Volatility framework (see Section Firmware Analysis).
Further tests were conductedwith non-infected ACPI tables
of original manufacturers as well as manually-manipulated
tables that covered a wide range of malicious accesses to
kernel memory. Objective of our experiments was to
examine ACPI-related data structures and automatically
distinguish potentially infected components from legiti-
mate program parts. In total, 299 operation regions were
evaluated. The corresponding results are shown in Table 2.
As can be seen, the scanner ﬂagged 29.4% of all opera-
tion regions as malicious. In reality however, only 13% of
these regions represented true rootkit activity. The
remaining 16.4% were erroneously reported and are due to
legitimate memory accesses in the AML virtual machine. In
contrast 61.9% of the operation regions were correctly
recognized as benign and do not reference any kernel
memory. Last but not least, 8.7% of the regions could not be
evaluated because their respective arguments were dy-
namic. If the parameters of a region depend on a variable orTable 1
Ability of memory acquisition solutions to acquire ﬁrmware code and data.
Acquisition tool Firmware acquired
Memoryze 7
FTK Imager 7
Moonsols DumpIt 7
WinPmem 7
WinPmem 3 (pci) ✓
WindowsMemoryReader 7
LiMe 7
Pmem 7
Pmem (pci) ✓the result of a function call, it is impossible to determine
the target of the operation with static code analysis. Eval-
uating those would require the state of the runtime envi-
ronment at the given time they are executed. The missing
regions can thus not be classiﬁed and have to be manually
analyzed.
Our results can be summarized as follows: On the one
hand, due to our plug-in, more than three ﬁfths of all
memory accesses do not need to be examined in detail and
may safely be ignored in the course of an investigation. As
such, forensic practitioners beneﬁt from considerable time
savings and are able to focus on the relevant sections of an
ACPI program. On the other hand, with 16.4%, the number
of false positives is still rather high. As we have already
indicated, these misclassiﬁcations stem from the fact that
we were unable to distinguish accesses to regions that
belong to legitimate ACPI memory from those that access
actual kernel data structures. To decrease the false positive
rate, an in-depth analysis of the ACPI environment of the
kernel would be necessary. For this task, further research in
the future must be conducted.
Discussion
Even though our approach is capable of reliably
dumping all ﬁrmware code and data and may be easily
integrated with existing memory forensic procedures,
practitioners have to be aware of several technological
limitations and pitfalls. A brief discussion of these will be
subject of the following sections.
Technological limitations
Some ﬁrmware rootkits cannot be detected with soft-
ware-based memory forensic methods. Any rootkit that
completely isolates itself from the CPU-accessible memory
falls into this category. SMM rootkits, for instance, patch the
BIOS to inject code into System Management Mode. This
code is run when a System Management Interrupt (SMI) is
triggered. The System Management Mode comprises its
own address space, i.e., SystemManagement RAM (SMRAM),
and is strictly separated from accesses by kernel or user
space applications. The Memory Controller Hub (MCH) en-
forces this restriction. By a similar reasoning, malicious
programs running on the Management Engine (ME, Stewin
and Bystrov, 2012) cannot be discovered.8 The only way
of obtaining a copy of the respective memory regions8 The Management Engine (ME) is a co-processor on the chipset that is
used to perform administrative tasks. For more information on this topic,
please refer to Kumar (2009).
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(Halderman et al., 2008). For this purpose, physical access
to the machine and a system reboot would be required. As a
recent study has indicated though, such attacks do not
reliably work on modern RAM technologies such as DDR3
anymore (Gruhn and Müller, 2013).
Anti-forensics
It is also possible for ﬁrmware to hide or even wipe
malicious code and data from RAM before the acquisition
process commences. If the only malicious component that
is still in memory at runtime resides in SMRAM, it is pro-
tected by the MCH and will not appear in the memory
image. Any bootstrapping code in the ﬁrmware can be
wiped from memory after performing its designated task.
In this situation, the only way of acquiring the malicious
code is by either using a ﬂash programmer to physically
read the ROM chip or running a tool like Copernicus
(Butterworth et al., 2013) if Intel TXT is available.
Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed possibilities for root-
kits and other sophisticated malicious applications to
compromise x86 systems at the ﬁrmware level. Although
yet rarely seen in the wild, these types of attacks are highly
dangerous andmay be particularly devastating because the
base of the machine is subverted at a very early point of
time and corresponding traces are easily overlooked during
typical system investigation routines. As we have seen,
common memory forensic solutions distributed on the
market to date fail to properly acquire the respective
sources of the physical address space and are therefore ill-
prepared in the course of an incident. We have therefore
suggested alternative techniques for improving current
imaging approaches based on PCI introspection and page
table entry remapping. Our insights are incorporated in the
software products Winpmem and Pmem and will be made
available in the Rekall memory forensic framework. We
have also created two plug-ins for the Volatility and Rekall
forensic frameworks to facilitate inspection of the ACPI
environment and discover traces of malevolent behavior
more quickly.
Opportunities for future research
In spite of our plug-ins, automated methods for
analyzing the ﬁrmware layer for signs of system infections
are still sparse. For this reason, a strong focus should be put
on identifying and developing additional detection capa-
bilities. Moreover, in order to discover ACPI-related threats
more efﬁciently, creating an emulator for naturally pro-
cessing the ACPI Machine Language (AML) would prove
fruitful.
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